3FS Fraud Desk · a record, not a rumour · every claim carries its source or the word UNVERIFIED
Case file · received 28–29 October 2026 · published 29 October 2026

Two document packages. Seventeen trillion in claimed value. Zero dollars that exist.

A $5,000,000,000 "International Bill of Exchange" drawn on a US Treasury debt-collection office, and a €12,000,000,000,000 "HSBC server-to-server upload" waiting for one more signature before it "mints" into a DeFi bridge. Below is every page, every number and every mark, checked against the documents themselves, Companies House, the IP registries, the Ethereum chain and the US Treasury's own fraud alerts.

Dossier A · Putnam Group / ALM
Fictitious instrument
A private draft drawn on the Treasury Offset Program. The pattern the Treasury Inspector General and the OCC have warned about since 2001. REAL sources
Dossier B · Sports Capital Partners / "HSBC"
Fictitious transfer
Terminal theatre: a Namecheap server, a Barclays certificate, three wallet addresses that have never existed on-chain. REAL reads
The follow-up ask · "analog KTT, what ratios?"
No. No ratios.
Key Tested Telex is a retired authentication method, not a way to move money. The "ratio" is the fee. See our answer.
01 · What arrived

Six files, hashed on receipt

Hashes let anyone who receives the same package confirm it is the same package. The files themselves are not republished here; the exhibits below are crops with personal data removed.

FileBytesSHA-256Producer / notes REAL
ALM - IBOE # 67494 - Notorized (25 FEB 2021).pdf4,027,763e0a7416a…5a285228 scanned pages, no text layer, PDFium, created 2021-02-25. "67494" in the filename is the tail of a USPS tracking number.
CIS Sports Capital Partners.pdf620,3032f875a65…0bb44 pages, Microsoft Word, internal title "CIS Sports Capital 2022", created 2025-02-19. Contains a passport scan (not published).
12T_POF.pdf537,269fed88e48…d2298 pages; pages 1–2 repeated four times byte-for-byte. Icecream PDF Editor 2.5.2 on macOS 15.5, created 2026-07-13, modified 2026-08-14.
12TLiq.json4,7087bf28662…1de1"Liquidity pool" and "DEX aggregator" object. Not valid JSON (unterminated string on the second route).
12TLiquidityCrypto.json5,072bb95ea28…d081"SWIFT → bridge mint" object with three "validators".
VIDEO-2026-10-28-22-35-03.mp44,931,71498c35faa…021572.7 s, 672×576 H.264. A blue "BANK REPORT CONSOLE / HSBC SYSTEM" screen recording dated 26 October 2026.
02 · Dossier A

The $5,000,000,000 "International Bill of Exchange"

Dated 15 February 2021, maturing 15 February 2036, issued by Putnam Group Ltd (Mahopac, New York) to ALM - Investment Holding Ltd (then of Finchley, London; Companies House 11904482), notarised in Dutchess County, New York, and wrapped in a UCC-1 filing, an "irrevocable bond power", affidavits, a Treasury release-of-information form and an apostilled copy of a UK incorporation certificate. DOC

The bill of exchange: $5,000,000,000.00 payable to ALM Investment Holding, drawee UST Bureau of Fiscal Service, Birmingham Alabama
Exhibit A1 · page 3. Drawee: "UST – Bureau of Fiscal Service (Offset Payments), TOCS, P.O. Box 1686, Birmingham, Alabama". The "Certificate No." and "Control #" are US Postal Service tracking numbers. The drawer is a private individual styled "Private Banker International" (name and P.O. box pixelated by us).
UCC financing statement header stamped 2021 Feb 15 AM10:54 with ALM Investment Holding as the acknowledgement address
Exhibit A2 · page 6. New York Department of State UCC-1, filing 202102158070462. A UCC office records what it is handed; it does not examine whether the "collateral" exists.
Ornate red-bordered Irrevocable Bond Power certificate with two embossed seals
Exhibit A3 · page 20. "Irrevocable Bond Power" with gold and red seals. Decorative borders and embossed seals are the costume of this instrument family; none of it is a bank.
UK apostille APO-1810978 dated 24 January 2020 certifying a notary's signature
Exhibit A4 · page 18. UK apostille APO-1810978, 24 January 2020. It certifies that a London notary's signature is genuine on a copy of a Companies House certificate. It says nothing about $5 billion.

What the documents say, and what is actually true

03 · Dossier B

The €12,000,000,000,000 "S2S upload" from "HSBC"

A "SWIFT.COM internal banking copy" says HSBC UK Bank plc uploaded twelve trillion euro of "M1 funds" in "S2S upload format" from an account in the name of Sports Capital Partners Limited (Companies House 08274883). Two JSON files route it into a Uniswap pool and an "ACKBridgeToken" contract that will mint "ackUSD" once a third validator signs. A video shows a blue bank terminal confirming the balance. DOC

Page one of the proof of funds: a black terminal-style page headed SWIFT.COM with codes and an upload progress bar
Exhibit B1 · 12T_POF.pdf page 1. Fields include "PERMIT ARRIVAL MONEY NUMBER", "WTS (Windows Terminal Server)", "FARM 21", "USER NAME: SYS_ADMIN", a four-line "upload in process 10% … 100%", three router licence lines and a certificate chain. Pages 3, 5 and 7 are byte-identical copies.
HSBC logo drawn in red ASCII characters on a blue terminal screen
Exhibit B2 · video, 0:00. "BANK REPORT CONSOLE". The HSBC hexagon drawn in ASCII. HSBC's name, BIC and a real HSBC IP range are used as props throughout; nothing in the package originates from HSBC.
Terminal screen headed BALANCE REPORTING showing rows of unix STREAM CONNECTED sockets
Exhibit B3 · video, 1:00. The "BALANCE REPORTING" body is a Linux unix-domain-socket listing (the output of a netstat-style command), scrolled to look like ledger activity.
Terminal lines: SYSTEM MESSAGE ACTIVATED MONEY PATCH USING SYSTEM, INSERT MONEY PATCH, AVAILABLE FUNDS 12,000,000,000,000.00 EUR
Exhibit B4 · video, 1:04. "ACTIVATED MONEY PATCH USING SYSTEM. INSERT MONEY PATCH." Banks do not patch money.

Network and cryptography

Time, place and company

04 · The JSON, line by line

What a "DeFi allocation engine" looks like when nobody ran it

12TLiq.json

"base_amount":        "12000000000000.00",
"converted_amount":   "2000115204718785.28",   ← 2 quadrillion USDT
"exchange_rate_applied": "1.15",
"conversion_rate":    "0.16",                  ← contradicts 1.15
"liquidity_pool": {
  "protocol": "uniswap_v3",
  "pool_address": "193.108.72.19",         ← an IP, not a contract
  "reserves": { "ETH": "12300000000000.00" }, ← ~100,000× all ETH
  "fee_tier": "6000000000.00",
  "slippage_tolerance": "13800000000000.00",
  "utilization_rate": "66,67%" },
"api_integrations": {
  "price_oracle": { "provider": "Chainlink",
    "headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer YOUR_CHAINLINK_API_KEY" } },
  "dex_aggregator_api": { "provider": "1inch",
    "headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer YOUR_CHAINLINK_API_KEY" } },
  "blockchain_node": { "provider": "HSBC UK BANK PLC",
    "endpoint": "https://api.1inch.io/v5.0/1/swap" } },
"blockchain_transaction": {
  "input": "0xswap_eth_usdt_uniswapV3_allocation" }, ← not hex
"audit_trail": { "validated_by": "Chainlink_Oracle_Audit_Node" }

12TLiquidityCrypto.json

"transaction": {
  "uetr_hash": "0x7f4c2d1b…c712",           ← a UETR is a UUID
  "imad_number": "20260508EURFW9182736450",
  "status": "PENDING_BRIDGE_MINT",
  "confirmations_received": 0 },
"bridge": {
  "contract_name": "ACKBridgeToken",
  "contract_address": "0xA91B…0012",        ← no code on mainnet
  "quorum_required": 3, "processed": false },
"validators": [
  { "wallet": "0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111", "signature": "0x8b3f…0111" },
  { "wallet": "0x2222222222222222222222222222222222222222", "signature": "0x7cc9…1222" },
  { "wallet": "0x3333333333333333333333333333333333333333", "signature": null } ],
"network": { "server_global_ip": "193.108.72.19",
  "ip_interface": "162.254.35.81",         ← Namecheap shared host
  "port": 21 },
"blockchain_execution": {
  "block_number": null, "tx_hash": null,
  "mint_status": "WAITING_FOR_FINAL_SIGNATURE" },
"result": { "message": "ALL ACCESS HAS BEEN GRANTED", "completion": "100%" }

The business model is in the status field. "Waiting for final signature", "pending bridge mint", "final release code: (blank)". The next message is always the same: a fee, a "ratio", an "insurance wrap" or a "SWIFT activation" payable in real money to release the imaginary one.

05 · Marks used on the documents

Every logo in the packages, and what its owner actually does

Issuer · Dossier A
Putnam Group Ltd
Mahopac, New York. Letterhead and signature on every affidavit.
Not a bank. Registration numbers on the letterhead unverified.
Stamp · Dossier A
NY Department of State
Received a UCC-1 at 10:54 on 15 Feb 2021 and issued an apostille.
Does not examine, value or approve the "collateral".
"Drawee" · Dossier A
US Bureau of the Fiscal Service
Collects delinquent federal debts through the Treasury Offset Program from Birmingham, Alabama.
Does not pay private bills of exchange. Treasury calls these drafts fraudulent.
Prop · Dossier A
US Postal Service
Delivered a certified letter, number 7018 3090 0001 3426 7494.
That number is the bill's "certificate number".
Register · both dossiers
Companies House
Registers UK companies. ALM 11904482: dissolved 22 Sep 2026. Sports Capital Partners 08274883: proposal to strike off.
Incorporation is a £12 online form, not a credential.
Stamp · Dossier A
UK Foreign Office apostille
Certified a London notary's signature on a copy of a certificate of incorporation (APO-1810978, 24 Jan 2020).
Certifies the notary's seal, not the content of anything.
Account holder · Dossier B
Sports Capital Partners Ltd
London E1W. Micro-company accounts, overdue; strike-off proposed 29 Sep 2026.
Not the holder of €12 trillion at anyone's bank.
Named as sender · Dossier B
HSBC UK Bank plc
A real bank whose name, BIC HBUKGB4B and public IP range were copied into the package.
Nothing in the package originates from HSBC. Treat "HSBC" contact details supplied by the counterparty as theirs, not HSBC's.
Certificate owner · Dossier B
Barclays PLC
Owner of the DigiCert EV certificate pasted into the "HSBC" document.
Not mentioned anywhere else in the package. Wrong bank's certificate.
Certificate authority · Dossier B
DigiCert Inc
Issued the (Barclays) certificate whose truncated chain pads out the proof of funds.
A TLS certificate secures a website connection. It does not evidence funds.
Network named · Dossier B
Swift (the cooperative)
Runs the interbank messaging network. Messages carry a 36-character UUID UETR and travel over SwiftNet, not "S2S on port 21".
There is no "SWIFT.COM internal banking copy" format and no "server-to-server upload".
Chain named · Dossier B
Ethereum mainnet
Public ledger. Anyone can check any address. We did.
None of the three addresses has ever had a balance, a transaction or code.
Protocol named · Dossier B
Uniswap v3
Decentralised exchange whose pools are contracts at 0x addresses.
"Pool address 193.108.72.19" is an IP. Reserves of 12.3 trillion ETH cannot exist.
Aggregator named · Dossier B
1inch
DEX aggregator with a public swap API.
Listed as "HSBC UK BANK PLC"'s blockchain node. It is not.
Price feed named · Dossier B
Binance
Exchange; public ticker endpoint cited for ETH/USDT.
A public price URL proves only that the author can read documentation.
Output currency · Dossier B
Tether USDT
Stablecoin contract 0xdAC1…1ec7 on Ethereum.
The "raw transaction" in the file is addressed to USDC's contract instead.
Named · Dossier B
PancakeSwap, SushiSwap
Listed as "supported DEX".
PancakeSwap's main deployment is on BNB Chain, not the Ethereum pool described.
Authority cited · Dossier A
UN / UNCITRAL
Adopted the 1988 Bills of Exchange Convention by A/RES/43/165.
The Convention is not in force (5 of 10 parties) and binds no US bureau.
Cited · both dossiers
ICC Banking Commission, FATF
Publish private trade-finance rules (ICC) and AML recommendations (FATF).
"ICC Publication 593" is unidentified. "FATF 6/01" is a stock phrase of PPP scam kits.
06 · The vocabulary

"Can you do an analog KTT, and what are your ratios?"

That question arrived after the dossiers. It is the tell that identifies the whole genre. Here is what each word means to the people who use it, and what it actually is.

They sayWhat it isWhat they mean
KTT / "analog KTT" / "manual KTT"Key Tested Telex: the pre-SWIFT way banks authenticated telex messages with a shared test key. Retired decades ago. No bank settles value by telex today, "analog" or otherwise. UNVERIFIED citationA transfer that cannot be traced, verified or reversed because it does not exist, "explained" by the counterparty's bank being too old-fashioned to show up on SWIFT.
S2S, server-to-server, IP/IP, IP-to-IP, "upload", "download"Networking words. Real interbank payment traffic runs over SWIFT's network, RTGS systems (Fedwire, CHAPS, TARGET2) or card and ACH rails, every one of which produces a reference you can confirm with your own bank.The "sender" will connect a server to your bank's server and push a balance across. Your bank will never see it. You will be asked to pay for the "receiver" or the "download fee".
M1 funds, M0/M1/M2, "fresh cut", "slightly seasoned"M1 is a central-bank statistic for the money stock. It is not a grade of money and no account is denominated in "M1 funds".Language that makes a fictitious balance sound like a technical category of real money.
Ledger-to-ledger, "off-ledger", "black screen", "grey screen", "money patch"Nothing. Banks have one ledger. There is no off-ledger money and no screen colour that reveals hidden funds.Why the balance will never appear on a statement or a SWIFT confirmation.
MT103 "one-way", "MT103/202 manual download", "GPI semi-automatic", "MT199 pre-advice"MT103 is a real customer credit transfer message, MT202 a bank-to-bank one, MT199 free text, gpi a tracking service. None has a "one-way" or "manual download" variant.A screenshot of a message that was never sent, offered as proof of a payment that never settled.
Ratios: 60/40, 70/30, 80/20, "receiver gets 40"The split of the imaginary face value between "provider" and "receiver".The fee. The receiver pays a percentage, an "activation", "insurance wrap" or "paymaster" cost in real, clean money to receive a percentage of money that does not exist. The ratio is the only number in the deal that is real.
Receiver, provider, mandate, paymaster, "fee protection agreement"Role names from the private-placement-programme script.Who pays (receiver), who collects (provider, via paymaster), and the contract that makes paying look safe.
07 · Our answer

What UnyKorn tells anyone who asks about KTT, S2S, IP/IP, M1 or ratios

No. UnyKorn LLC does not transact by KTT, "analog KTT", S2S, IP/IP, ledger-to-ledger, "M1 funds" uploads, "money patch", one-way MT103 or ratio arrangements, and quotes no ratios, because none of those move money. We accept exactly three kinds of transfer, each one verifiable by us without your help: a SWIFT MT103 or ISO 20022 pacs.008 that our bank confirms as settled; a Fedwire or ACH credit that posts to our account; or an on-chain stablecoin transfer with a transaction hash on a public chain. If you hold the funds you describe, send a confirmable €1 test by any of those routes. Until then there is nothing to discuss, and no fee of any kind will be paid by us to anyone.

That is the complete reply. It does not argue, it does not insult, and it asks for the one thing the counterparty cannot produce.

08 · Identifiers to block

If any of these reaches your desk, you are looking at the same package

IdentifierWhere it appearsNote
P17M74R3HSVETIERFWDossier B reference numberSame reference across PDF, JSON and video, six months apart.
GB73 HBUK 4002 44•• ••••71 · acct 738•••71 · sort 40-02-44Dossier B "sender account"Masked here. Do not rely on it; do not pay to it. HBUKGB4B is HSBC's own BIC used as a prop.
HSBC-UK/SRT-NR-39 · 931025309370266313 · HBUKGB4BXXX9103819939919301034Dossier B document and transaction codesInvented formats.
0x9F4B61A7e4B2dC4cF4e7A3F89D9D0e8A8c1b9F11 · 0xA91B6C72D2d4f71A8A8b0B5C39d72D5A90fB0012 · 0x7A3F9c2D8E1b4F6a9C0d5E8b1A2c3F9e7D6b5A1CDossier B recipient, "ACKBridgeToken", signerNever used on Ethereum mainnet; all fail EIP-55.
162.254.35.81 · server1.hakimoverse.comDossier B "IP interface"Namecheap shared hosting. The real origin of the "terminal".
7018 3090 0001 3426 7494 · 9590 9402 3609 7305 1657 11Dossier A "certificate" and "control" numbersUSPS Certified Mail and return-receipt numbers.
UCC 202102158070462 (NY DOS)Dossier ANotice filing only. Not re-queried in this pass.
APO-1810978Dossier A apostilleCertifies a notary's signature on a company certificate copy.
Companies House 11904482 (dissolved 22 Sep 2026) · 08274883 (proposal to strike off)Both dossiersCheck the live register before any dealing: find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk
09 · Where to report

United States

FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center, ic3.gov. Treasury Inspector General (bogus Treasury drafts), oig.treasury.gov. Your bank's fraud desk if any instrument was presented for deposit.

United Kingdom

Action Fraud, actionfraud.police.uk. Financial Conduct Authority, fca.org.uk. HSBC UK's published fraud contact (from hsbc.co.uk, never from the counterparty). Companies House for misuse of a registered company's details.

On-chain

Nothing to report yet: no transaction exists. If you are asked to send a "gas", "activation" or "bridge" fee to any address, stop. Check the address on a public explorer first; a fresh, empty address is the norm for this scheme.

10 · Method and sources

What we checked, how, and what we did not

Checked on 29 October 2026 REAL

  • Companies House: company pages, officers and filing history for 11904482 and 08274883.
  • RIPE and ARIN RDAP for 193.108.72.19, AS20705 and 162.254.35.81; reverse DNS.
  • Blockscout (Ethereum mainnet) for the three 0x addresses; EIP-55 checksum computed; raw transaction RLP decoded.
  • IBAN mod-97 computed; certificate block base64-decoded and parsed.
  • UN Treaty Collection and UNCITRAL status pages for A/RES/43/165; Treasury OIG and OCC alert pages on bogus bills of exchange.
  • PDF metadata and page-level text and image extraction; video frames extracted at 4-second intervals.
  • SHA-256 of every file as received.

Not done in this pass UNVERIFIED

  • Sanctions screening (OFAC, UK) of the named companies and individuals.
  • New York Department of State UCC search for 202102158070462.
  • USPS tracking history for 70183090000134267494.
  • Putnam Group Ltd registration with New York.
  • Confirmation from HSBC UK that the account does or does not exist (only the account holder or law enforcement can obtain that).
  • Identification of "ICC Publication No. 593".

File hashes (SHA-256)

e0a7416adb8ceb3cebb9271d8e168fbd6568a559bf59b4cd3380de878a5a2852  ALM - IBOE # 67494 - Notorized ( 25 FEB 2021 ).pdf
2f875a65fbba147b17ecf195dbb4b70b17be56061d7391d06091ffc661cf0bb4  CIS Sports Capital Partners.pdf
fed88e48d198b0493fcdc7891dfcd8068cc02777fb8958cb88ade945a2a4d229  12T_POF.pdf
7bf28662cf58ee910cdbc7e35e3f2e3dac0fe85aef63cfd62ed59bf5d7451de1  12TLiq.json
bb95ea2863f68bb84677548327fa40b31ee89b42e93ba09ddb243ccf47d0d081  12TLiquidityCrypto.json
98c35faa37e6159e632a3e3b9a963fcad0e4a07319430ed842573db692870215  VIDEO-2026-10-28-22-35-03.mp4